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Executive summary 
The gross general government debt-to-GDP ratios in many advanced economies have 
reached the highest levels in peacetime history and continue to grow, putting into question 
sovereign solvency in these economies. In case of new adverse shocks, whether economic or 
political, global or country-specific, which result in the deterioration of growth prospects or 
higher real interest rates, or both, the situation could easily get out control.
Apart from the risk of sovereign default, excessive public debt might also have a neg-
ative impact on the stability of financial sector and on economic growth in the medium 
and long term.
Our debt sustainability simulations for the group of highly-indebted advanced economies 
– those in which the general government gross public debt-to-GDP ratio exceeded 80 percent 
in 2015 – suggest that benefits of the current record-low interest rates and post-crisis growth 
recovery should be used for fiscal consolidation. The aim of this should be not only to stop 
further expansion of debt-to-GDP ratios, but also to gradually reduce them. Such corrective 
measures are needed in six out of seven G7 members (Germany being the exception) and in 
10 out of 19 euro-area members. The fiscal situation of Japan, where gross debt has reached 
250 percent of GDP, is particularly precarious. 
In addition, unless there are reforms of public pension, health and long-term care 
systems, fiscal consolidation in advanced economies must also create room for the higher 
spending levels in these areas that will result from aging populations.
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1 Introduction
One of the consequences of the global financial crisis has been rapid growth in public debt 
in most advanced economies1. This is the result of overoptimistic estimates of the fiscal 
situation before the crisis, declining government revenues and increasing social expenditure 
during the crisis, combined with the costs of financial system restructuring, countercyclical 
fiscal policies and slower growth since the crisis. In addition, negative demographic trends 
(population aging) add to both explicit and implicit public debt in the medium and long runs. 
In this context, in 2015, general government gross debt exceeded 100 percent of GDP in 
Japan, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus, Belgium and the United States, in some cases by large 
margins (Japan’s gross debt approaches 250 percent)2. In Spain, Singapore, France, Ireland 
and Canada it was between 90 and 100 percent of GDP, and in the United Kingdom, Austria 
and Slovenia it was between 80 and 90 percent. In many countries, these are record highs in 
peacetime. For the group of advanced economies as a whole, it is the highest debt level since 
the late 1940s (Gaspar and Escolano, 2016). 
Only in four of the highly-indebted advanced economies – Ireland, Germany, Iceland and 
Israel – has there been a decreasing debt-to-GDP trend recently. In other cases, the debt-to-
GDP ratio has either stabilised at a high level or continues to grow, bringing into question 
sovereign solvency in the medium-to-long term. 
Surprisingly, relatively little attention has been paid to this threat in debates over policy3 
(except in countries that have already lost market access, such as Greece). Questions about 
rising debt have been overshadowed by numerous calls to abandon ‘austerity’ policies (see eg 
Krugman, 2015, or Bloomberg, 2016), downplaying of the risks of high debt (Skidelsky, 2016), 
or even arguments (contrary to statistical evidence) that debt has already started declining 
(Roubini, 2016). Financial markets also seem to have turned a blind eye to the issue of the 
fiscal sustainability of several sovereign borrowers. This is perhaps a result of dominant short-
termism in both policy debates and the business strategies of financial market players. 
This sort of myopia underestimates the potential negative consequences of excessive 
sovereign debt for financial stability and growth, globally and, in particular, in Japan and 
Europe. A strong adverse shock could easily trigger a financial crisis of much greater 
magnitude that the 2007-09 global financial crisis, or the European financial crisis of 2010-13.
In this Policy Contribution, we assess the size of public debt in advanced economies 
and consider the potential consequences of sovereign insolvency. We make simple debt 
sustainability projections for advanced economies to estimate the primary fiscal balances 
required to stabilise or reduce the 2015 gross debt-to-GDP level on the basis of various 
macroeconomic assumptions. We also analyse major implicit public commitments related to 
public pensions, healthcare and long-term care systems and financial systems, and look at the 
potential negative spillovers from excessive public debt onto the financial sector and growth.
1  The term advanced economies is borrowed from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (IMF 
WEO) country grouping; see http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/weoselagr.aspx. To simplify 
the analysis, we do not include Hong Kong, Macau, Puerto Rico or San Marino, which belong to the group of advanced 
economies in the IMF WEO classification. 
2  Figures from IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016 edition.
3  Rogoff (2012), Feldstein (2016a; 2016b), Reinhart (2016) and Boskin (2016) are recent examples of warnings, al-
though formulated in a rather soft manner. 
Surprisingly, 
relatively little 
attention has been 
paid to the rapid 
growth in public debt 
in most advanced 
economies.
3 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚21 | 2016
2 The dynamics of public debt
Table 1 provides an overview of general government gross debt in advanced economies from 
1999-2015. A number of observations can be made based on this data:
1. In most of the countries shown, the debt level in 2015 was higher, sometimes much 
higher, than in 1999. Belgium, Denmark, Malta, Sweden, Switzerland and, probably, Israel 
(comparable 1999 data for this country is not available) are exceptions. 
2. The same observation holds in aggregate for the European Union, the euro area and, most 
likely, the group of advanced economies overall (there is a lack of comparable data for 
1999). For the EU the increase is 23.3 percentage points of GDP and for the euro area, 22.8 
percentage points of GDP. 
3. Two sub-periods can be distinguished – before and after the global financial crisis. 
Between 1999 and 2007, because of high growth, several countries (Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) reduced their gross 
debt-to-GDP levels. However, others failed to do so, either stabilising their earlier high 
debt-to-GDP ratios, or further increasing them. This group included the largest economies 
such as the US, Japan, Germany, the UK and France; oil-producing Norway, Asian ‘tigers’ 
(Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, although the first two from moderate levels), Austria and 
the Czech Republic (the latter also from low to moderate level); and countries that later 
were victims of the European financial crisis – Greece, Portugal and Cyprus. 
4. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, general government gross debt increased 
rapidly almost everywhere except the few countries mentioned in paragraph 1, above. 
Declining growth (see Figure 1), especially in the 2009 recession, and financial sector 
problems were the major drivers of this trend. More specifically: (i) government revenues 
declined sharply, especially revenues from the financial sector, which had contributed 
to a major part of total revenue before the crisis; (ii) in many countries, governments 
had to support failing banks and other financial institutions to avoid/mitigate systemic 
financial crisis (see section 5.3); (iii) social expenditures increased as result of higher 
unemployment and lower personal incomes; (iv) many countries launched discretionary 
fiscal stimulus both on the revenue and expenditure sides.
Figure 1: Annual change in real GDP in advanced economies, %, 1998-2015
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016.
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Table 1: Advanced economies, general government gross debt, % of GDP, 1999-
2015
Country/country group 1999 2003 2007 2010 2013 2015
Australia 22.6 13.2 9.7 20.5 30.8 36.8
Austria 66.4 65.5 64.8 82.3 80.8 86.2
Belgium 114.4 101.1 86.9 99.6 105.1 106.3
Canada 89.3 76.2 66.8 81.1 86.1 91.5
Cyprus 55.9 63.4 53.6 56.3 102.5 108.7
Czech Rep. 15.2 28.1 27.8 38.2 45.2 40.9
Denmark 56.8 46.2 27.3 42.9 44.6 45.6
Estonia 6.0 5.6 3.7 6.6 9.9 10.1
Finland 44.0 42.7 34.0 47.1 55.4 62.4
France 60.0 63.9 64.2 81.5 92.3 96.8
Germany 60.0 63.0 63.6 81.0 77.4 71.0
Greece 88.6 93.9 102.8 145.8 176.9 178.4
Iceland 39.1 38.5 27.3 88.3 84.8 67.6
Ireland 46.7 29.9 23.9 86.8 120.0 95.2
Israel n/a 92.9 72.7 70.6 67.2 64.6
Italy 109.7 100.5 99.8 115.4 128.9 132.6
Japan 135.6 169.6 183.0 215.8 244.5 248.1
Korea 16.7 20.4 28.7 30.8 33.8 35.9
Latvia 11.8 13.9 7.2 40.3 35.9 34.8
Lithuania 28.1 21.0 16.7 36.3 38.8 42.5
Luxembourg 6.7 6.4 7.0 19.6 23.3 21.8
Malta 69.5 68.7 62.4 67.6 68.6 64.0
Netherlands 58.2 49.3 42.4 59.0 67.9 67.6
New Zealand 28.5 22.0 14.5 26.9 30.8 30.4
Norway 24.3 42.7 49.2 42.4 30.3 27.9
Portugal 49.0 54.7 68.4 96.2 129.0 128.8
Singapore 83.6 97.6 84.7 97.0 102.5 98.2
Slovakia 47.1 41.6 29.9 40.8 54.6 52.6
Slovenia 22.0 27.0 22.7 37.9 70.5 83.3
Spain 62.5 47.6 35.5 60.1 93.7 99.0
Sweden 61.4 49.1 38.1 37.6 39.8 44.1
Switzerland 55.8 59.4 49.5 46.1 46.4 45.6
Taiwan 23.7 32.0 32.1 36.7 39.1 38.3
UK 41.7 37.3 43.5 76.6 86.2 89.3
US n/a 58.5 64.0 94.7 104.8 105.8
Advanced economies n/a 73.4 71.4 97.6 104.8 104.8
Euro area 70.4 67.8 64.9 84.0 93.4 93.2
EU 64.1 60.7 58.3 78.5 87.0 87.4
Source: IMF WEO, April 2016. Note: cells in yellow indicate IMF staff estimates. Note: EU countries Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania are not included in the IMF advanced economies grouping.
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5. As of autumn 2016, eight years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, public debt expansion 
has not stopped in most advanced economies, especially in those with high and very high 
debt levels. Only four – Ireland, Germany, Iceland, and Israel – have started reducing their 
debt-to-GDP ratios. Among the countries with low or moderate gross debt-to-GDP levels, a 
visible decreasing trend could be observed only for the Czech Republic, Latvia, Norway and 
Switzerland. Aggregate ratios for advanced economies, the euro area and the EU stabilised 
at very high levels (104.8, 93.2 and 87.4 percent of GDP, respectively).
6. In 2015, 14 out of 19 euro-area countries breached the upper general government gross 
debt limit of 60 percent of GDP as determined by the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. 
Ten of them recorded debt levels higher than 80 percent of GDP, and five (Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Cyprus and Belgium) had debt higher than 100 percent of GDP. Interestingly, 
the group that breached the 60 percent level includes not only countries affected by the 
European financial crisis, such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus and Slovenia, 
but also those which are generally considered part of the ‘prudent’ core or ‘North’ 
(Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Austria, Belgium and France). 
7. Outside the euro area, the biggest ‘sinners’ were Japan (248.1 percent of GDP), the US 
(105.8 percent of GDP), Singapore (98.2 percent of GDP), Canada (91.5 percent of GDP) 
and the UK (89.3 percent of GDP). Worse, none of these, except Singapore, was able to 
reverse the debt expansion trend. 
8. As Figures 1 and 2 show, economic growth in most advanced economies from 2011-
15 remained considerably lower than in the pre-crisis decade of 1998-2007, making it 
unlikely that they will ‘outgrow’ their debts. 
Overall, the picture looks rather gloomy and puts into question the debt sustainability of at 
least some of the analysed countries.
Figure 2: Average annual changes in real GDP in highly-indebted advanced 
economies, in percent, 1998-2007, 2008-10, and 2011-15
Source: World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016.
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3 Debt sustainability analysis
To verify whether the public debt in the highly-indebted advanced economies remains on 
a sustainable path we carried out two simple debt simulations (Box 1). First, Simulation 1 
determines the primary fi scal balance-to-GDP ratios required to stabilise countries’ 2015 
debt-to-GDP ratios assuming that in subsequent years, the rate of real GDP growth and 
real interest rates will remain at the 2015 level. Both assumptions can be considered rather 
optimistic, given relatively good growth in 2015 in most analysed countries compared to 
the 2011-2015 average (Figure 2), and historically record-low nominal and real long-term 
interest rates in 2015 (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Ten-year interest rate on government bonds and inﬂ ation, 1970-2013, % 
(simple average across France, Germany, UK and US)
Source: IMF (2014), Figure 3.1, p81.
Table 2 presents the results of Simulation 1. Eight out of fourteen analysed countries do 
not need to conduct additional fi scal adjustment to stabilise their gross debt-to-GDP ratios 
at the 2015 level. In fact, they can even relax their fi scal policies and stay within the assumed 
debt limit. France and the US must undertake relatively modest fi scal tightening eff orts (less 
than 1 percent of GDP). Four remaining countries (Japan, the UK, Cyprus and Canada) are in 
less comfortable positions.
Japan’s fi scal position looks particularly precarious from this simple and static simulation. 
It must improve its primary general government balance by more than 3 percent of GDP 
to prevent a further increase in its gross debt-to-GDP ratio. And one must remember that a 
negative real interest rate of -1.62 percent in 2015 was very supportive of the Japanese budget 
and will not necessarily be continued in the subsequent years.
As mentioned, the macroeconomic parameters in 2015 were relatively favourable in most 
advanced economies – economic growth was close to potential and there were historically 
record-low nominal and real interest rates. Such conditions will not necessarily continue in 
the medium to long term. 
In particular, real interest rates might pick up at some point, for example as a result 
of exit from extra-loose monetary policies. Real interest rates for government bonds are 
determined by a range of sometimes contradictory factors related to the global supply of 
savings and demand for those particular instruments (see IMF, 2014, chapter 3). While 
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predicting how these factors will work in future goes beyond remit of this paper, we cannot 
exclude real interest rate increases and should therefore test the impact of this variable in 
our sustainability analysis to understand its potential consequences for the size of fi scal 
adjustment required to avoid further debt-to-GDP increases. We thus run Simulation 2, 
which assumes real interest rates of 2 percent for each country, this level being justifi ed by the 
average historical record of advanced economies prior to the global fi nancial crisis (Figure 3). 
Other assumptions remain the same as in Simulation 1. 
Box 1: Debt sustainability simulations
Our simulations are based on the following equation (Escolano 2010)
 
                                                                                  (Eq.1)
where d
t
 = general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of period t 
d
t-1
 = general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of period t-1
r
t
 = real interest rate in period t computed as r
t
 = [(1+ i
t
)/(1+ π
t
)]–1
i
t
 = nominal interest rate in period t
π
t
 = change in the GDP defl ator between t – 1 and t
g
t
 = the rate of growth of real GDP between t-1 to t
p
t
 = the ratio of primary fi scal balance (defi cit or surplus) to GDP in period t
It follows from Eq.1 that an increase in the general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio 
can be explained by:
• General government primary defi cit, ie when non-interest general government expendi-
ture exceeds its revenue;
• Real interest rate of general government borrowing which exceeds the real growth rate of GDP.
For this analysis, we defi ne highly-indebted advanced economies as those whose general 
government gross public debt-to-GDP ratio exceeded 80 percent in 2015 (see Table 1). We 
exclude Greece from our sample because it was the subject of the subsequent rescue pro-
grammes, under which debt fi nancing has been provided at below market interest rates. Fur-
thermore, Greece is unlikely to return to the private debt market soon. Perhaps another debt 
restructuring will be needed for Greece to regain market access (see IMF, 2016a).
We run two simulations to estimate the minimum primary fi scal balance required to 
achieve the targeted level of general government gross public debt in relation to GDP under 
various sets of assumptions. Consequently, we rewrite Eq.1 as follows:
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The results of Simulation 2 (Table 3) look more alarming than those of Simulation 1. 
All countries except Ireland4 would have to undertake serious fiscal adjustment to prevent 
further expansion of their debt-to-GDP ratios. For Japan, fiscal tightening of close to 9 percent 
of GDP may look problematic politically5, even if Japan’s room to increase taxes6 seems to be 
greater than that available to other advanced economies. An increase of real interest rates to 
historically ‘normal’ levels would make Japan’s public debt burden hardly controllable.
Table 2: Highly-indebted advanced economies: fiscal adjustment required to 
stabilise 2015 debt-to-GDP ratio (Simulation 1, 2015 parameters)
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook database, April 2016 for dt-1, πt, gt and actual pt, Bloomberg for it. Notes: (1) columns 2, 3, 8, 9 and 
10 in percentage of GDP, columns 4-7 in percent; (2) dt-1 – gross general government debt-to-GDP ratio in 2015, it – annual average of 
yields of 10-year Treasury bonds in 2015, πt – GDP deflator in 2015, gt – annual change of GDP in 2015, dt – exogenous assumption. See 
also Box 1.
Furthermore, the assumption of a real interest rate equal to 2 percent for everybody 
disregards country-specific risk premia. In practice, if financial markets have doubts about 
government creditworthiness, the real interest rate might increase rapidly (above 2 percent), 
which will further worsen the prospects of sovereign solvency. This kind of vicious circle of 
market expectations (or multiple equilibria) has been observed during many sovereign debt 
crises, eg in Mexico in 1994, Russia in 1997-1998, Argentina in 2000-02, Greece in 2009-10, 
Ireland in 2010, Portugal in 2010-11 and Cyprus in 2012-13. In the highly-indebted economies, 
sudden changes in market sentiment can happen as a result of either external or country-
specific shocks (economic or political). Such a risk applies not only to the already crisis-affected 
4  In 2015 Ireland recorded exceptionally high annual growth of 7.81 percent (effect of the post-crisis recovery) and 
a negative interest rate of almost 4 percent (a result of high inflation). Even if one can be optimistic about Ireland’s 
future growth prospects, its growth rates in the next few years will, most likely, be lower than in 2015. 
5  We agree with Eichengreen and Panizza (2014) that running a high primary surplus for a longer period may be 
politically difficult. 
6  Especially VAT, which was 8 percent in 2015, while total general government revenues amounted to 34 percent of GDP.
Country d
t-1
d
t
i
t
π
t
r
t
g
t,
p
t
 (required) p
t
 (actual 2015)
Minimum 
size of fiscal 
adjustment (8-9)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Austria 86.20 86.20 0.74 1.5 -0.75 0.88 -1.75 0.31 -2.06
Belgium 106.30 106.30 0.85 0.9 -0.04 1.37 -1.31 -0.28 -1.03
Canada 91.50 91.50 1.53 -0.5 2.07 1.18 0.78 -0.71 1.49
Cyprus 108.70 108.70 3.88 -1.4 5.37 1.59 3.85 1.44 2.41
France 96.80 96.80 0.86 1.2 -0.32 1.14 -1.48 -1.72 0.24
Ireland 95.20 95.20 1.18 5.3 -3.92 7.81 -11.24 1.12 -12.36
Italy 132.60 132.60 1.70 0.8 0.94 0.76 0.36 1.39 -1.03
Japan 248.10 248.10 0.36 2.0 -1.62 0.47 -1.80 -4.93 3.13
Portugal 128.80 128.80 2.43 1.9 0.48 1.47 -0.65 -0.28 -0.37
Singapore 98.20 98.20 2.43 1.6 0.78 2.01 -1.24 -0.31 -0.93
Slovenia 83.30 83.30 1.67 0.4 1.23 2.88 -2.16 -0.57 -1.60
Spain 99.00 99.00 1.74 0.6 1.12 3.21 -2.05 -1.81 -0.24
UK 89.30 89.30 1.82 0.3 1.50 2.25 -1.00 -2.83 1.83
US 105.80 105.80 2.13 1.0 1.12 2.43 -1.15 -1.75 0.60
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countries in the euro area but also to Japan, Italy, Belgium, France and the UK. In other words, 
high public debt renders countries more vulnerable to changes in market sentiment. 
Simulations 1 and 2 assume no improvement in the high debt-to-GDP ratios of 2015 (the 
debt-to-GDP ratios of EU members are significantly above the Treaty’s limits). To avoid a debt 
trap, a policy of at least slow debt reduction is needed.
Let us assume that each analysed country needs to reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio by 2 
percentage points annually from its 2015 level. This is hardly a too-ambitious target for 
countries with debt exceeding 100 percent of GDP (Italy, Portugal, Cyprus, Belgium, US) or 
200 percent of GDP (Japan). For EU countries with debt exceeding 60 percent of GDP, the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) requires the debt level to be reduced at an annual rate of 
1/20th of the difference between the actual and the reference level, ie 60 percent of GDP 
(Vade Mecum, p72). Thus, each EU country with a debt-to-GDP level exceeding 100 percent is 
obliged to downsize it by more than 2 percentage points of GDP annually.
Table 3: Highly-indebted advanced economies: fiscal adjustment required to stabilise 
the debt-to-GDP ratio of 2015 (Simulation 2 – 2015 parameters, rt = 2 percent)
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016. Notes: (1) columns 2-3, and 6-8 in percentage of GDP, columns 4-5 in percent; 
(2) gt – annual change of GDP in 2015; rt and dt – exogenous assumptions. See also Box 1.
According to our calculations (Eq. 2 in Box 1) a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio by 2 
percentage points requires the primary fiscal balance to be improved, compared to the results 
of Simulations 1 and 2, by an additional 2 percentage points of GDP. For several countries, 
achieving such a goal would necessitate serious fiscal tightening. This would affect Japan, 
Cyprus, the UK and Canada in Simulation 1, and all countries except Ireland in Simulation 2. 
This suggests that there is a justification for starting fiscal adjustment now when real interest 
rates are at a historically low level, rather than postponing further. 
In summary, the fiscal prospects of advanced economies look potentially alarming and 
call for corrective measures. This is the case for six out of seven G7 members, Germany being 
the only exception. Among the 19 euro-area countries, 10 belong to the group of highly-in-
debted economies as defined in this Policy Contribution. 
Japan’s fiscal situation is particularly worrying despite its substantially lower general gov-
ernment net debt-to-GDP ratio (see section 4). A similar conclusion has been reached by the 
IMF (2016b, pp48-56). In this context, Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman’s calls for new massive 
fiscal stimulus to increase the Japanese growth rate (Nikkei 2016; Sharp 2016) seem to disre-
gard Japan’s worrying public debt levels and the ineffectiveness of similar policies in the past7. 
The fiscal positions of other highly indebted advanced economies seem to be manageable, 
7  Japan experienced a severe and prolonged financial crisis in the 1990s (see Kanaya and Woo, 2000) and has never 
returned to the pre-crisis high growth rates despite more than two decades of ultra-loose monetary policy and subse-
quent fiscal stimulus packages. As result, its gross general government debt-to-GDP level increased from 67.0 percent 
in 1990 to 210.2 percent in 2009 and further to 248.0 percent in 2015. 
Country dt-1 dt rt gt
pt  
(required)
pt  (actual 2015)
Minimum size of fiscal 
adjustment
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Austria 86.20 86.20 2.00 0.88 2.96 0.31 2.65
Belgium 106.30 106.30 2.00 1.37 2.67 -0.28 2.95
Canada 91.50 91.50 2.00 1.18 2.68 -0.71 3.39
Cyprus 108.70 108.70 2.00 1.59 2.50 1.44 1.06
France 96.80 96.80 2.00 1.14 2.79 -1.72 4.51
Ireland 95.20 95.20 2.00 7.81 -3.90 1.12 -5.02
Italy 132.60 132.60 2.00 0.76 3.40 1.39 2.01
The fiscal prospects of 
advanced economies 
look potentially 
alarming and call for 
corrective measures.
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to various degrees, assuming that real interest rates will not increase soon (Simulation 1) and 
that the fiscal adjustment suggested by our simulations is not postponed. However, in case of 
new adverse shocks, whether economic or political, global or country-specific, that result in 
the deterioration of growth prospects or higher real interest rates, or both, the situation could 
easily get out control.
4 Gross versus net debt
The general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio is the most popular measure of countries’ 
sovereign indebtedness. However, it does not take into account government assets which, at 
least partly, can counterbalance government liabilities.
To address this problem, fiscal statistics use the indicator of general government net debt, 
which is defined as “…gross debt minus financial assets corresponding to debt instruments. 
These financial assets are: monetary gold and SDRs, currency and deposits, debt securities, 
loans, insurance, pension, and standardized guarantee schemes, and other accounts receiva-
ble” (GFSM, 2013, para. 7.245). 
Gross and net debt can differ substantially when it comes to official creditors, commod-
ity exporters (especially oil producers) who enjoy high resource rents and are able to form 
sovereign wealth funds during times of commodity booms, and large funded public pension 
schemes. 
Among the highly-indebted advanced economies, the difference between general govern-
ment gross and net debt is biggest in Japan (Figure 4). Japan’s general government net debt 
amounts approximately to only half of its gross debt (a difference of more than 120 percent-
age points of GDP). This is another factor (apart from untapped tax potential – see section 3) 
which allows Japan to continue to enjoy a good credit rating and to avoid high risk premia, 
despite record-high gross public debt.
Figure 4: Highly-indebted advanced economies: general government gross and net 
debt-to-GDP ratios, in percent, 2014
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016. 
An even bigger difference in relative but not in absolute terms is recorded in Canada. Cana-
dian general government net debt amounts approximately to one third of its gross debt (a differ-
ence of almost 60 percentage points of GDP). The difference is also substantial (approximately 
20 percentage points of GDP or more) in Austria, Belgium, Spain, the US, Italy and Ireland. 
Among the highly-
indebted advanced 
economies, the 
difference between 
general government 
gross and net debt is 
biggest in Japan.
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Using net debt instead of gross debt has both advantages and disadvantages. It seems 
conceptually and methodologically correct to take into consideration both sides of the 
government’s balance sheet, but net public debt is not always easily measurable because of 
incomplete statistics on public financial assets8. Nor does net public debt provide a complete 
picture of current and future sovereign solvency because of the varying quality and liquidity 
of public financial assets. In particular, government pension assets are illiquid by definition, 
while loans to other countries are often granted based on political rather than economic crite-
ria and are therefore hardly recoverable.
It is worth noting that the general government net debt-to-GDP measure does not include 
government nonfinancial assets such as real estate, public sector enterprises, government 
shares in commercial companies, natural resources and license rights. The market values of 
these can be substantial if well managed9 and proceeds from their sale (privatisation) can 
reduce both gross and net public debt.
5 Public liabilities not included in the 
definition of public debt
5.1 General remarks
Despite the broadening of the definition of public debt in the IMF Government Finance Sta-
tistics Manual 2001 (GFS 2001) and European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 
2010) accounting frameworks10, some government liabilities remain outside the statistics, for 
example unfunded public pension, healthcare and long-term care liabilities, and contingent 
liabilities related to the financial sector. 
To close the gap between funded and unfunded liabilities, at least partly, GFS 2001 recom-
mends the preparation by governments of separate statements on the explicit contingent lia-
bilities not included in the current public debt statistics (such as one-off guarantees) and on 
unfunded state pension liabilities (GFSM, 2013, chapter 7). The ESA 2010 statistical standards 
approved by the European Parliament and Council of the EU in May 2013, which are being 
gradually implemented, take a further step. Apart from a separate statement on the implicit 
liabilities of the state pension system (ESA 2010, 2013: para. 17.121 and subsequent para-
graphs; ESA 2010, 2016, Chapters I.3 and III.6) the standards oblige governments to reflect in 
public debt statistics changes to pension systems that influence the levels of future implicit 
public liabilities (see section 5.2). 
Unfunded pension, healthcare and long-term care liabilities differ from ‘standard’ debt 
instruments in terms of their liquidity and the way they are financed. They do not need to be 
rolled over on the market but must be paid down in future budget periods, including the costs 
of their servicing (when they are subject to indexation). Therefore, they add to future expend-
iture streams. If these liabilities increase, future public pension, health and long-term care 
expenditure will increase respectively (and vice versa). 
Implicit liabilities related to the financial sector have a contingent character. That is, under 
an optimistic assumption of perfect financial stability, they can be never called in. However, 
once called in, they must be paid down immediately to avoid a systemic disruption of the 
financial sector.
8  For the highly-indebted advanced economies analysed in this paper, the IMF World Economic Outlook Database 
does not provide general government net debt statistics for Cyprus, Singapore and Slovenia. 
9  See Detter and Foelster (2015) on the management of public assets. 
10  See https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/ and http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/esa-2010.
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5.2 Unfunded pension liabilities
Implicit or unfunded pension liabilities originate from the specific design of public pension 
systems based on an intergenerational contract: the pensions of current pensioners are fund-
ed by pension contributions or taxes paid by the currently employed (the pay-as-you-go, or 
PAYG, system). Consequently, a substantial implicit pension debt from the unfunded pension 
scheme is created (Kane and Palacios, 1996).
Figure 5: Implicit pension liabilities in EU member states, 2006 (in percent of GDP, 
projected benefit obligations)
Source: Mueller, Raffelhueschen and Weddige (2009), Figure 50.
There is no single methodology to estimate implicit pension liabilities11. Mueller, Raffel-
hueschen and Weddige (2009), in a study commissioned by the European Central Bank that 
offers the most comprehensive and cross-country comparable estimation to date for 19 EU 
countries, focused on the accrued-to-date liabilities, ie the obligations that would have to be 
paid if the systems were phased out immediately. As result, the authors used the projected 
benefit obligation method of estimating implicit pension liabilities (Figure 5).
In all cases, these estimates exceeded the level of official general government gross debt 
in the mid-2000s (Figure 5 and Table 1) by considerable margins and were often several times 
the gross debt level. Since the estimates were made, the levels of implicit public debt have 
likely changed because of updated demographic forecasts and pension reforms, such as 
changes to statutory and actual retirement ages. 
In its 2015 Aging Report, the European Commission (2015) does not offer an implicit 
pension debt projection but estimates changes in future public pension expenditure, which 
can be considered as the cost of redemption and servicing of unfunded pension liabilities. If 
this expenditure item increases it will suggest increased implicit pension debt and vice versa. 
A projected increase in public pension expenditure means that additional fiscal adjustment 
will be necessary beyond the figures estimated in Simulations 1-2 (section 3), all other things 
being equal. Alternatively, an expected reduction in public pension expenditure gives more 
room for fiscal manoeuvre.
As Figure 6 shows, several EU countries are on the way to halting the rapid growth of 
public pension expenditure (and, consequently, future pension liabilities) that was observed 
in the 1990s and 2000s and was caused by population aging. This is a consequence of pension 
reforms carried out in the 2000s and 2010s, which increased retirement ages, reduced pen-
sion privileges for certain sectors and professional groups, improved pension contribution 
payment discipline, and cut the average pension to average wage ratio (ie the replacement 
11  See Beltrametti and Della Valle (2011) for a conceptual and methodological discussion on the nature of pension 
debt and its measurement. 
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ratio). Transitioning from defined benefits systems to defined contribution systems reduced 
or at least stopped further increases in the replacement ratio and created an incentive for later 
retirement and better payment discipline.
However, according to European Commission (2015), not all countries have managed 
so far to curtail the expected increase in public pension expenditure. Others have stabilised 
their pension spending at a relatively high level, and in some cases the positive effects of past 
reforms will expire soon. Among the highly-indebted countries, Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, 
Cyprus, Slovenia, the UK, Italy, France and Austria should undertake further reforms, as 
should less-indebted Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Malta and Lithuania.  
Figure 6: Changes in gross public pension expenditure, 2013-30 (percent of GDP) 
Source: European Commission (2015), Table II.1.14.
Apart from reforming public pension systems themselves (along the lines elaborated 
above), raising labour market participation rates (especially for women) and encouraging 
legal labour immigration will also help to reduce future liabilities. In all countries, politicians 
should avoid the populist temptation to reverse or soften reforms adopted to date.
Mueller, Raffelhueschen and Weddige (2009) and European Commission (2015) do not 
cover non-EU advanced economies such as the US, Japan and Canada. However, earlier 
cross-country comparative analyses (eg Chand and Jaeger, 1996) suggest that their implicit 
public pension debts are probably lower than in Europe because of the greater role of funded 
pension schemes. 
The absence of public pension liabilities in public debt statistics distorts the picture of 
sovereign indebtedness and also creates negative incentives in terms of pension reform. For 
example, when the fiscal situation in many countries sharply deteriorated in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis, some decided to reverse the earlier second-pillar pension reforms 
(mandatory funded public pension schemes) and transfer pension fund assets and liabilities 
back to the PAYG system. Such measures were taken, for example, by Argentina, Hungary and 
Poland and, to a lesser extent, by other central and eastern European countries (Barbone, 
2011; Jarrett, 2011). For these countries, official data on general government deficit and debt 
in accordance with GFS 2001 and ESA95 (the predecessor of ESA 2010) shows improvement, 
but implicit pension liabilities have increased. However, the new ESA 2010 reporting stand-
ards will make such practices of ‘creative’ fiscal accounting more difficult because the effects 
of institutional changes in public pension systems will have to be at least partially reflected in 
fiscal statistics.
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5.3 Public healthcare and long-term care liabilities
Implicit fiscal (intergenerational) liabilities also exist in the public healthcare and long-
term care systems. The mechanism is similar to that of the public pension system, though 
the amount of contingent liabilities is more difficult to determine for many policy and 
technical reasons.
Present-day taxpayers pay mandatory contributions to public medical insurance funds 
(or in the form of general taxes) and most will require health and long-term care services in 
the last years of their lives. Negative demographic trends and population aging contribute to 
increased hidden debts. Technological progress in medical services and the related increase in 
costs also contribute to the growth of future public healthcare and long-term care liabilities.
Obviously, liabilities related to the public healthcare and long-term care systems are not 
as precisely determined as public PAYG pension system liabilities. Governments have some 
room for manoeuvre in the organisation of public healthcare and long-term care services and 
factors such as their cost management, determining individual entitlements, co-payments 
and contributions/tax rates (for example, elimination of various group privileges) (Clements 
et al, 2011). Estimates of implicit liabilities will therefore depend on detailed assumptions and 
the calculation method used. 
One example covering a larger group of countries is Medearis and Hishov (2010) who cal-
culated implicit public healthcare liabilities for EU countries and the US by extrapolating the 
so-called ‘health care fiscal sustainability gap’, defined as the difference between real annual 
growth in per-capita health spending (over the period 2000-08) and real annual growth in 
per-capita GDP for the period of 25 years ahead. 
Their results vary substantially: from 20 percent of GDP (Hungary) to over 500 percent 
of GDP (Luxembourg). Interestingly, liabilities in the US public healthcare system (which 
provides only limited coverage) exceeded 200 percent of GDP. In many EU countries, the sit-
uation looked even worse: in Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Spain, public healthcare 
liabilities exceeded 200 percent of GDP; 300 percent of GDP in Poland and Sweden; and 400 
percent of GDP in Finland, Ireland and Slovakia.
Figure 7: Changes in public health and long-term care expenditure, 2013-30 
(percent of GDP), demographic scenario 
Source: European Commission (2015), Tables III.1.102 and III.1.114.
Medearis and Hishov (2010) used a debatable method that focused on extrapolation 
of past cost trends rather than on demographic factors. Nevertheless, their results suggest 
that unfunded public healthcare liabilities are substantial. In some countries, they exceed 
unfunded pension liabilities. 
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European Commission (2015) estimated only future changes in public healthcare and 
long-term care expenditure, similarly to public pension expenditure. For the purpose of our 
analysis we choose the so-called demographic scenario, which presents the consequences 
of demographic changes only (Figure 7) and disregards other potential factors such as the 
impact of technical progress on the costs of medical services. All EU countries will record 
increases in public health and long-term care spending by 2030, which is not the case for 
public pension systems. For the entire EU, the magnitude of this increase will be twice the 
pension expenditure increase. The biggest challenges will be faced by Malta, Finland, Den-
mark, Croatia, Netherlands, Germany and Slovakia, and by highly-indebted Slovenia, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain, Austria and France. 
Again, the expected increase in future public health and long-term care spending will 
require additional fiscal adjustment beyond the estimates of Simulations 1-2, all other things 
being equal.
5.4 Contingent liabilities related to financial stability
The functioning of the fractional-reserve banking system might result in banking crises from 
time to time. To avoid a banking panic, the collapse of the financial system, the spread of 
crises to other countries and adverse shocks to the real economy, governments often decide 
to support insolvent banks, for example, by replenishing their capital or purchasing their 
problematic assets. Occasionally, several years later, these expenditures can be at least partly 
recovered through the privatisation of banks nationalised during the crisis or by cashing in 
assets taken over during a crisis.  
Differently from public pension, healthcare and long-term care systems, government lia-
bilities related to the financial sector have undeclared (implicit)12 and potential (contingency) 
character. Their realisation depends on the probability of a financial crisis and its potential 
scale and consequences. 
The potential magnitude of those liabilities depends on many factors, such as the ratio of 
bank assets to GDP (the higher the ratio, the greater the potential liabilities), the structure of 
the banking sector (a concentration of banks increases the risk of a systemic banking crisis), 
its ownership structure (state ownership increases the risk of crisis; the same pertains to pri-
vate ownership if the bank is involved in related lending), and the quality of banking legisla-
tion, regulation and supervision.
The adverse fiscal consequences of bank crises are usually considerable, which has been 
confirmed by the global and European financial crises. One can distinguish between (1) 
direct fiscal costs of government intervention (eg recapitalisation of banks, asset purchases 
and asset guarantees) and (2) overall fiscal costs of banking crises as measured by changes in 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio (Amaglobeli et al, 2015). For purpose of our analysis (estimation 
of implicit fiscal liabilities) the first (narrower) concept seems to be more appropriate. 
Laeven and Valencia (2012, Table A2) estimated gross and net direct fiscal costs of policy 
responses to systemic banking crises for the period 2007-11, which covered the first phase 
of the global financial crisis and the early part of the European financial crisis13. Gross direct 
fiscal outlays involve government expenditure for bank recapitalisation and asset purchases. 
Net fiscal outlays are equal to the difference between gross outlays and amounts recovered. 
The highest gross fiscal outlays were recorded in Iceland (44.2 percent of GDP), Ireland 
(40.7 percent of GDP), Greece (27.3 percent of GDP), the Netherlands (12.7 percent of GDP) 
and the UK (8.8 percent of GDP). However in Iceland, the Netherlands and the UK, part of the 
government support was recovered, so the net outlays in the analysed period amounted to 
20.5, 5.6 and 6.6 percent of GDP, respectively. 
12  There are also explicit contingent liabilities, especially those related to the deposit insurance system, which 
although formally self-funded (from bank contributions), often needs fiscal backstopping. 
13  The analysed time span left out the later stages of banking crises in Greece, Spain, Cyprus and Slovenia.
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These amounts have been already included in the official general government debt-to-
GDP statistics of the respective countries. They do not necessarily indicate the size of future 
government liabilities in respect of the financial sector. One can hope that the new set of 
financial regulations and institutions introduced in response to the global and European 
financial crises (including EU banking union and the bail-in principle in case of bank insol-
vency) make large-scale crises less likely and reduce taxpayers’ potential contribution to their 
resolution. On the other hand, the current prolonged period of record-low (in some instances, 
negative) nominal interest rates, slow economic growth and increasing public indebtedness 
can create new risks.
6 Potential negative spillovers
Fast growth of sovereign debt in advanced economies can have negative economic, social and 
political consequences. In this section, we concentrate on two of these: financial stability risks 
and the negative impact on economic growth.
6.1 Financial stability risk
In section 5.3 we analysed the adverse fiscal consequences of systemic banking crises. 
However, the sovereign-bank loop can also work in the opposite direction: problems with 
sovereign solvency will negatively affect banking systems and the entire financial sector as a 
substantial holder of government debt instruments. The banking crises in Greece (2010-13 
and again in 2015-16) and in Cyprus (2012-13) – in both cases the result of excessive expo-
sure of banks to Greece’s sovereign debt – well illustrate this danger. Several banking crises in 
emerging-market economies in the 1980s and 1990s (for example, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, 
Russia, Ukraine and Turkey) also had their roots, at least partly, in public debt crises. 
Bruegel’s database developed by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) shows that some euro-
area countries have high exposure to marketable sovereign debt held by deposit banks. In 
2011, this exposure amounted to 20.8 percent of GDP in Portugal, 16.9 percent of GDP in Italy, 
16.1 percent of GDP in Greece, 15.9 percent of GDP in Spain, 15.7 percent of GDP in Ger-
many and 9.6 percent of GDP in Ireland. Banks in other countries, in particular in the US, UK, 
France and the Netherlands, were less exposed. 
The updated database14 shows only the percentage of total marketable debt held by 
domestic deposit banks and does not give explicit bank exposure to public debt measured in 
percent of GDP at the end of 2015. However, the rapid expansion of debt-to-GDP ratios and 
domestic banks’ shares of government bond markets mean that this exposure has increased 
in most analysed countries since 2011. This is the case in, in particular, Ireland, Greece, Italy, 
Spain and, most probably, Portugal15. Furthermore, because of the national fragmentation of 
the euro-area financial market as a result of the European financial crisis, the home-country 
bias has increased (Merler, 2014), meaning less cross-border sovereign exposure (and there-
fore risk sharing) and an even stronger reliance by domestic banks on fiscal consolidation in 
highly-indebted countries. 
The Bruegel database does not include Japan. However, according to the IMF (2016b, 
Table 2), in 2015 net credit to the nonfinancial public sector in Japan accounted for approxi-
mately half of the net domestic assets of depository corporations and this ratio has remained 
pretty stable over recent years. In relative terms, it amounted to 114.3 percent GDP in 2015. 
At the same time, the Bank of Japan’s net credit to the non-financial public sector quadrupled 
14  The Bruegel database of sovereign bond holdings developed by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012); update of May 
2016, see http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/201605_Bruegel_sovereign_bond_holding_dataset-1.xlsx. 
15  The data series for this country ends in 2013. 
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between 2011 and 2015 (reaching 57.8 percent of GDP in 2015), which suggests an increasing 
pace of de-facto public debt monetisation by the Japanese monetary authority (formally this is 
the result of the policy of quantitative easing conducted by the Japanese central bank). 
In addition to increasing commercial banks’ sovereign exposures, sovereign debt instru-
ments (at least the ones issued by the governments in leading advanced economies) have 
other important functions that are based on the assumption of their risk-free character. There 
is, for example, their role as collateral in central bank lending to commercial banks, central 
bank international reserve assets, reserve assets of sovereign wealth funds, life insurance 
companies, pension funds and other investment funds, and as liquidity instruments in daily 
financial market operations. Greece’s recent sovereign debt crisis demonstrated its far-reach-
ing disruptive consequences not only for the domestic and euro-area financial sectors, but 
also for the European Central Bank’s monetary policy operations. It is hard to predict the scale 
of potential negative effects in case of public debt sustainability problems in larger countries 
such as Japan, Italy, France or the UK.
6.2 Potential negative impact on economic growth
Several empirical analyses (eg Checherita and Rother, 2010; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010; Kumar 
and Woo, 2010; Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli, 2011) confirm that the negative impact of 
public debt on economic growth follows a non-linear pattern. That is, when the debt-to-GDP 
level is low or moderate, it is difficult to detect such a negative impact. However, the impact 
becomes visible once the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds a certain high threshold, for example, 80 
or 90 percent.
According to Checherita and Rother (2010), there are four channels through which this 
negative impact can materialise: (i) private saving, (ii) public investment, (iii) total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP), and (iv) sovereign long-term nominal and real interest rates. In a similar vein, 
Ostry, Gosh and Espinoza (2015, p.5) argue that “inherited public debt represents a dead-
weight burden on the economy, reducing both investment potential and growth prospects’ […] 
via ‘…the present value of the distortionary costs of the taxation needed to service the debt”. 
Ardagna, Caselli and Lane (2007), Kinoshita (2006) and several other studies (see IMF, 
2013 for an overview) also confirm that high public debt has a non-linear impact on long-
term real interest rates. This means not only the risk of a fiscal vicious circle leading, in 
extreme cases, to sovereign insolvency, but also higher financing costs for business and, 
therefore, slower growth.
Thus high public debt adds to the already existing supply-side barriers in advanced econ-
omies, such as shrinking working-age populations, stagnating investment (Dabrowski, 2013) 
and lower TFP growth (Gordon, 2016). 
On the demand side, rapidly expanding public debt can create various kinds of uncertain-
ties, such as fear of higher future taxation or risk of sovereign default and associated financial 
crisis and can, therefore, harm consumers and investment spending. Thus one can expect 
more Ricardian than Keynesian effects of fiscal expansion when public debt is high.
7 Policy conclusions and recommendations
It is time to reassess the approach to the fiscal policy stance and continuous expansion of 
public debt in advanced economies. As this analysis demonstrates, without improving prima-
ry fiscal balances the sustainability of public debt, at least in some of advanced economies, 
can be put into question, especially if current GDP growth rates decline or real interest rates 
go up (which could happen as a result of any new economic or political shock). In this con-
text, calls for further fiscal stimulus need to be balanced against the negative consequences of 
explosive debt dynamics. 
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Waiting for ‘better times’ for fiscal adjustment is a risky strategy because the interest 
rate-growth differential might deteriorate in comparison with the rather favourable situation 
in 2015. Real interest rates, which are now at a historically low level as result of extremely 
accommodative monetary policy, at least in the euro area and Japan, might increase at some 
point. Growth rates are also unlikely to pick up soon and, in some countries, they could fur-
ther deteriorate as a result of the looming demographic crisis. 
Interestingly, the IMF, which backed countercyclical fiscal policies in advanced economies 
in the wake of the global financial crisis and then warned against premature fiscal tighten-
ing, seems to be changing its attitude. While Ostry, Ghosh and Espinoza (2015) still argued 
against ‘deliberate’ paying down of debt by countries with ‘ample fiscal space’ (because the 
distorting costs of reducing debt would exceed expected crisis-insurance benefits) and opted 
for ‘organic’ reduction of debt-to-GDP ratios via growth and through the use of ‘less distor-
tionary sources of revenue’ (as compared to raising taxes) when available, Escolano and 
Gaspar (2016) went a step further and advocated a policy of ‘gradual smooth reduction in the 
debt-to-GDP ratio’. 
Indeed this might be an optimal strategy to tackle the excessive debt burden, although what 
‘gradual’ means requires clarification. Some countries must adjust faster or at least more signif-
icantly. These include Japan, Italy, Cyprus and Portugal. In all cases fiscal consolidation should 
be supported by comprehensive structural and institutional reforms that aim to both improve 
future growth potential and reduce future fiscal liabilities (explicit and implicit). Other highly 
indebted countries have a bit more room for manoeuvre and can move more gradually. 
All countries should reduce their debt levels when one-off fiscal opportunities arise, such 
as windfall gains or disposal of government assets (privatisation proceeds, auctioning of tele-
communication spectrum or selling natural resource licenses), especially when privatisations 
are expected to lead to efficiency gains that increase the value of the assets. 
Methodological effort to consolidate and broaden public debt statistics should be contin-
ued, especially through the inclusion of long-term unfunded public pension, healthcare and 
long-term care liabilities.
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